Search This Blog

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Anti-Trespassing Motion





In the Magistrate  Court of Pocahontas County, West Virginia

 Case # 13-M38M-00374  -State v. John Leyzorek

Lorren H.Demotto, Plaintiff

Vs.

John Leyzorek                           

9 December 2013                  

Motion #5, (Rev), for Dismissal due to lack of Jurisdiction or Standing   Page 1 of 3


Relief Requested

            Now comes before this honorable Court Defendant John Leyzorek, asking that the instant case and charge against him be DISMISSED, with prejudice, because the Division, Department, or Commissioner of Highways of West Virginia, through its agent Plaintiff Loren Demotto, and the Statute under which the instant charge is brought, have no lawful jurisdiction over my premises or activities.
History

            On or about 12 June of 2013,  Plaintiff Lorren Demotto unlawfully entered my property through my latched gate, past multiple “No Trespassing” signs, bearing a defective search warrant.  He claimed to be and to be acting as  an agent of the WV Division of Highways, and  made certain observations and expressed certain invidious personal opinions about my premises and possessions.

            He  correctly observed that the portion of my premises which he inspected was a mile or more (over 5,280 feet) from the  public road.

            On or about 10 September of the same year, he filed the instant false and malicious criminal complaint against me

Argument

            The instant charge is made under West Virginia Code §17-23- 9.

            Let it be noted that Chapter 17 of the Code is titled, “Roads and Highways”

            Let it be noted that no part of my property which is the subject of the instant action approaches at any point closer than approximately 3,000 feet from any public road or right of way, the observations by Mr Demotto which occasioned the instant charge were made approximately 4,000 feet from the nearest road.

            Let it be noted that Article 23 of the Code is introduced by the legislative findings which justify, and define the legislative intent of its provisions as follows:
           
§17-23-1. Legislative finding.

3
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the establishment, operation, maintenance and
use of salvage yards in areas adjacent to state roads, including federal-aid interstate and primary roads, is unsightly, visually offensive, depresses the value of the public investment in such roads, detracts from the safety and recreational value of travel thereon and destroys natural beauty, and therefore should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel thereupon, and to preserve natural
 beauty.   (bold type and underline added)

            I categorically deny that I possess, harbor,  or operate a salvage yard on my property,  but let it be noted that the above Code section refers specifically and exclusively to “areas adjacent to state roads”, as being appropriate subjects for control under the Chapter and Article of Statute, for certain clear,  specific and enumerated reasons.

§17-2A-8. Powers, duties and responsibilities of commissioner” ,  contains a list  of 40 items which I will not reproduce here, of which 32 relate directly and exclusively to roads, highways, and road rights-of-way, and the remainder refer to legal, fiduciary, or procedural duties connected to the maintenance of the road system.  Conspicuously absent from the list is any mention of regulation or oversight of private lands, land uses, or private business or personal activities unconnected with roads or transportation

            Title 157, Legislative Rule, Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, Series 6 is subtitled, “Use of State Rights of Way and Adjacent Areas”
Videlicet,
“§157-6-1 General, 1.1 Scope  -  This legislative rule establishes general rules pertaining to the use of State rights of way and adjacent areas
1.2 Authority – This rule is issued under authority of WV Code §§ 17-1, 2A, 4, 16, 20, 22, and 23”
(underline added)
            The title of this Rule repeats the prescription that its authority relates specifically and exclusively to roads and right-of-way and areas adjacent, and the Authority line 1.2, by referring back to Code section §17-23 (under which the instant charge is erroneously made) confirms that in the opinion of the DOH the specific and restricted applicability to highways and areas adjacent applies to  the regulation of salvage yards,  under which I am charged.

            The term "Adjacent", as found in the Statute  is defined in 23 U.S.C., Section 136(b) as “within 1000 feet”. All parts of my property are beyond dispute more than three times that distance from  any highway or public right-of-way.



Cornell University Law School's  Legal Information Institute  states,



“Any question of statutory interpretation begins with looking at the plain language of the statute to
discover its original intent. To discover a statute's original intent, courts first look to the words of the
3
statute and apply their usual and ordinary meanings.
The scope and clear rationale of of the regulatory power of the DOH and Chapter 17 of the Code is unambiguously stated in the Introduction to the Chapter, and it is, to protect aesthetic values visible from and adjacent to highways.
LIL continues, “
Other rules of statutory interpretation include, but are not limited to:
·      Statutes should be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute should not be inconsistent with the rest of the statute.
·      When the legislature enumerates an exception to a rule, one can infer that there are no other exceptions.

The Statute's introduction delimits its authority.  For a later provision to expand that authority would be inconsistent.  The Introduction prescribes no exceptions from the limitation of its authority to areas adjacent to highways, therefore no exceptions are to be made.

Were these principles not sufficient to fully resolve any supposed ambiguity, LIL continues by enunciating:

·      The Rule of Lenity: in construing an ambiguous criminal statute, a court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. ( Michie's Jurisprudence of West Virginia, "[i]t is ... fundamental ... that penal statutes ‘must be strictly construed against the state and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.’ " Commonwealth v. Knott, 11 Va.App. 44, 47, 396 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1990) (quoting Crews, 3 Va.App. at 536, 352 S.E.2d at 3). "Words of a penal law will not be extended by implication to the prejudice of the accused, and all reasonable doubt must be resolved in his favor." Waller v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 83, 88, 63 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1951)
317 (1994).)



            Thus it is clearly established that the DOT/DOH of which Mr.Demotto is an agent, and the Statute and rules which he is charged to enforce and under which the instant charge is brought,  have no jurisdiction, authority,  nor applicability to or over my property, therefore this case must be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

John Leyzorek, pro se defendant is not an attorney, and recognizes and admits his ignorance of many fine points of law and procedure, but respectfully asserts  an understanding of the principles of justice and of his rights and of the merit of his defense .              
 He respectfully demands as his right recognized in Cottrell v Cottrell, Bush v Hammer, and others, the indulgence and assistance of this honorable Court, wherever his research or his knowledge of  procedure may be deficient but he attempts in good faith to make a valid point or to assert a right, or wherever a valid defense or a right exists of which he is ignorant.
He reserves the right to edit this filing to correct errors or add supporting material.

(signed)
By Defendant Pro Se John Leyzorek   304-799-7191
2133 Edray Road
Marlinton, WV 24954

In the Magistrate  Court of Pocahontas County, West Virginia

 Case # 13-M38M-00374  -State v. John Leyzorek

Lorren H.Demotto, Plaintiff
Vs.
John Leyzorek                           

28 November 2013                  

Motion #9, for Dismissal due to Ambiguity Page 1 of 1


Relief Requested

            Now comes before this honorable Court Defendant John Leyzorek, asking that the instant case and charge against him be DISMISSED, with prejudice, because the statute and regulations under which I am charged are ambiguous,      which ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Defendant

History

            The instant charge under §17-23-9 is that I am maintaining a Public Nuisance  on my property, which alleged nuisance is comprised of assorted items of my intrinsically lawful personal property.

Argument
            "[i]t is ... fundamental ... that penal statutes ‘must be strictly construed against the state and limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute.’ " Commonwealth v. Knott, 11 Va.App. 44, 47, 396 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1990) (quoting Crews, 3 Va.App. at 536, 352 S.E.2d at 3). "Words of a penal law will not be extended by implication to the prejudice of the accused, and all reasonable doubt must be resolved in his favor." Waller v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 83, 88, 63 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1951) 317 (1994).



            The Statute is alleged by the prosecution to apply to any area of the State and thus to the property of the Defendant, however its opening section which expresses the legislative intent, clearly  applies it only to areas adjacent to the highway.   If attempt is made to violate the normal principles of statutory construction and read section nine separately from the rest of the Chapter of which it is part, nonetheless the existence of section one creates an ambiguity,  which must be resolved in favor of the Defendant, thus charges based thereon must be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

John Leyzorek, pro se defendant is not an attorney, and recognizes and admits his ignorance of many fine points of law and procedure, but respectfully asserts  an understanding of the principles of justice and of his rights and of the merit of his defense .              

 He respectfully demands as his right recognized in Cottrell v Cottrell, Bush v Hammer, and others, the indulgence and assistance of this honorable Court, wherever his research or his knowledge of  procedure may be deficient but he attempts in good faith to make a valid point or to assert a right, or wherever a valid defense or a right exists of which he is ignorant.
He reserves the right to edit this filing to correct errors or add supporting material.

(signed)By Defendant Pro Se John Leyzorek   304-799-7191
2133 Edray Road  Marlinton, WV 24954


No comments:

Post a Comment

We are making comments available again! You are free to express your First Amendment Rights Here!

About Me

A local archivist who specializes in all things Pocahontas County