What is Notice?

http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/docs/spring2003/31277.htm

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

January 2003 Term

__________

 

No. 31277

__________

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL.

MICHAEL C. FARBER,

Petitioner,

v.

    THE HONORABLE JAMES P. MAZZONE, JUDGE

OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BROOKE COUNTY,

AND JOHN R. BAILEY,

Respondent

__________________________________________________

 

Petition for Writ of Prohibition

WRIT GRANTED

__________________________________________________

Submitted: June 10, 2003

Filed: June 26, 2003

Michael C. Farber                                        David A. Neely
Pro Se                                                           Goldberg, Kamin & Garvin
                                                                       Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
                                                                       Attorney for the Respondent,
                                                                         John R. Bailey
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

     1. “'“A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).' Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Kees v. Sanders, 192 W. Va. 602, 453 S.E.2d 436 (1994).” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Bedell, 199 W. Va. 316, 484 S.E.2d 199 (1997).
    2. “When a court is attempting to proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, prohibition will issue as a matter of right regardless of the existence of other remedies.” Syl. Pt. 10, Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98 S.E. 162 (1919).
    3. “Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error, appeal or certiorari.” Syl. Pt. 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953).
    4. “Where an inferior court has rendered a judgment without jurisdiction its action is coram non judice, and prohibition will lie to prevent the enforcement thereof as soon as the judgment has been rendered. . . .” Syllabus, Willis v. Warth, 108 W. Va. 517, 151 S.E. 707 (1930), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Cruikshank, 138 W. Va. 332, 76 S.E.2d 744 (1953).
    5. “'A void judgment, being a nullity, may be attacked, collaterally or directly, at any time and in any court whenever any claim or right is asserted under such judgment.' Syl pt. 3, State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur, 142 W. Va. 737, 98 S.E.2d 418 (1957).” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Lemley v. Roberts, 164 W. Va. 457, 260 S.E.2d 850 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1981).


Per Curiam:


    Petitioner Michael C. Farber has requested this Court to issue of writ of prohibition against the Honorable James P. Mazzone of the Circuit Court of Brooke County preventing the lower court from asserting jurisdiction over him in the underlying professional liability action, due to defective service of process, and to quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring Mr. Farber to produce records in the underlying civil action. Having thoroughly reviewed the arguments of the parties, we grant the requested writ of prohibition.

I. Factual and Procedural History

    On July 11, 1997, Mr. John R. Bailey filed a complaint against Mr. Farber for legal malpractice in a domestic relations matter.   (See footnote 1)  On July 15, 1997, Mr. Bailey sought service of process by certified mail with “restricted delivery.”   (See footnote 2)  The return receipt indicated that the complaint was received by Ms. Kathy Winters, a temporary secretary in Mr. Farber's law office. On August 19, 1997, Mr. Bailey filed a Motion for Default Judgment based upon Mr. Farber's failure to respond to the complaint, explaining that Mr. Farber had been served on July 15, 1997, and had not responded.
    On November 3, 1997, Mr. Farber filed a response to the Motion for Default Judgment, contending that service of process had been defective and that the lower court consequently lacked jurisdiction over him. On January 27, 1998, the lower court, Judge Fred Risovich presiding, entered default judgment against Mr. Farber. Mr. Farber did not file an appeal to that default judgment. During a February 24, 1998, damages hearing, Mr. Farber filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment Order, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon his allegation of ineffective service of process. Mr. Farber contended that United States Postal Service rules provide that mail designated as “restricted delivery” should be delivered only to the addressee or the person authorized in writing to receive the mail. In the present situation, Mr. Farber had not authorized any other person to receive restricted delivery mail on Mr. Farber's behalf. The lower court refused to set aside the default judgment, and Mr. Farber did not appeal that decision. The February 24, 1998, hearing proceeded on the issue of damages, with Mr. Bailey testifying in his own behalf.
    By letter dated September 1, 1998, Mr. Farber informed the lower court that he refused to participate in further hearings relative to the civil action and opted to “advance my defense on appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeals.” However, no appeal was ever filed. An additional hearing on the issue of damages was conducted by the lower court on September 1, 1998. Although properly notified, Mr. Farber did not attend that hearing. Mr. Bailey presented expert testimony regarding his damages and also requested punitive damages. The lower court denied the request for punitive damages, pending receipt of financial information requested from Mr. Farber.    On September 23, 1998, Mr. Bailey served Mr. Farber with interrogatories and a request for production of documents to obtain the necessary financial information. Having received no response, Mr. Bailey filed an October 29, 1998, motion to compel Mr. Farber to respond to the requests. On November 24, 1998, the lower court entered an order compelling Mr. Farber to respond to the discovery requests within ten days. Mr. Farber did not respond.
    On February 10, 1999, Mr. Bailey served Mr. Farber with a subpoena duces tecum requiring Mr. Farber to bring all previously requested financial information to a hearing scheduled for April 9, 1999. When Mr. Farber did not appear for that hearing, the lower court issued a bench warrant for Mr. Farber's arrest, upon the request of counsel for Mr. Bailey. On December 10, 1999, Mr. Farber was taken into custody and delivered to the Central Regional Jail in Flatwoods, West Virginia. Mr. Farber immediately contacted a judge for the Circuit Court of Braxton County, who ordered that Mr. Farber be taken to the Braxton County Circuit Court for a bond hearing. Mr. Farber was thereafter released on personal recognizance.
    In July 2002, this civil action was scheduled for dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter was thereafter set for hearing on a rule to show cause why petitioner had not yet complied with prior orders regarding the subpoena. On November 7, 2002, Mr. Farber failed to appear for a scheduled hearing on punitive damages. On December 2, 2002, the lower court, Judge Mazzone presiding, entered an order with respect to the November 7, 2002, hearing and bifurcated this matter as to compensatory and punitive damages. The court awarded Mr. Bailey $71, 885.00   (See footnote 3)  in compensatory damages and ordered Mr. Farber to provide Mr. Bailey with the financial information relative to punitive damages originally requested through discovery in 1998.
    Prior to a scheduled February 10, 2003, hearing on a rule to show cause why Mr. Farber had failed to comply with court orders, Mr. Farber communicated with the lower court by letter, explaining that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to the serious illness of a friend. Mr. Farber requested an additional ten days within which to produce the requested documents. Based upon those representations, the lower court scheduled the matter for hearing on April 1, 2003.
    On March 31, 2003, Mr. Farber filed this petition for writ of prohibition to preclude further action in this matter. Mr. Farber contends that the mandates of Rule 4 regarding valid service of process are to be strictly construed to assure proper notice and opportunity to respond to civil complaints. He further asserts that Mr. Bailey's failure to comply with Rule 4 rendered the service of process invalid and that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against him. Likewise, Mr. Farber maintains that the lower court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena duces tecum against him. Mr. Farber requests this Court to (a) prohibit the lower court from asserting jurisdiction in this matter; (b) quash the subpoena and dismiss the complaint.
    In response to the requested writ of prohibition, the lower court contends that Mr. Farber is the victim of his own failure to pursue an appeal of the default judgment. Mr. Bailey likewise contends that valid service of process was obtained and that a default judgment was entered in January 1998. Mr. Bailey further maintains that because the default judgment was never appealed, it cannot be challenged in this writ of prohibition. 

II. Standard of Review

    The standard of review applicable to a writ of prohibition has been explained as follows:

        “'A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.' Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Kees v. Sanders, 192 W. Va. 602, 453 S.E.2d 436 (1994).

Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Bedell, 199 W. Va. 316, 484 S.E.2d 199 (1997). A writ of prohibition “lies as a matter of right whenever the inferior court (a) has not jurisdiction or (b) has jurisdiction but exceeds its legitimate powers and it matters not if the aggrieved party has some other remedy adequate or inadequate.” State ex rel. Valley Distributors, Inc. v. Oakley, 153 W. Va. 94, 99, 168 S.E.2d 532, 535 (1969).   (See footnote 4)  As this Court specified in syllabus point ten of Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98 S.E. 162 (1919), “When a court is attempting to proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, prohibition will issue as a matter of right regardless of the existence of other remedies.”
    

III. Discussion 

    The primary argument advanced in opposition to the requested writ of prohibition is premised upon Mr. Farber's failure to appeal the determinations of the lower court in this matter. West Virginia Code § 53-1-1 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2000) provides the general standard for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, as follows: “The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers.” As the respondents maintain, this Court has indicated that a writ of prohibition may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See Syl. Pt. 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953) (“Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ of error, appeal or certiorari”); see also State ex rel. Shelton v. Burnside, 212 W. Va. 514, 575 S.E.2d 124 (2002).
                                   
    With regard to the specific issue of the absence of jurisdiction, however, this Court has clarified that a writ of prohibition is obtainable as a matter of right, “regardless of the existence of other remedies.” Jennings, 83 W. Va. at 186, 98 S.E.2d at 162, syl. pt. 10, in part. “Traditionally, the writ of prohibition speaks purely to jurisdictional matters. It was not designed to correct errors which are correctable upon appeal.” State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 164 W. Va. 632, 635, 264 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1980) (citing State v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va. 878, 122 S.E.2d 851 (1961)). As this Court emphasized in the syllabus of Willis v. Warth, 108 W. Va. 517, 151 S.E. 707 (1930), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Cruikshank, 138 W. Va. 332, 76 S.E.2d 744 (1953), a case involving the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction over the petitioner, “Where an inferior court has rendered a judgment without jurisdiction its action is coram non judice,   (See footnote 5)  and prohibition will lie to prevent the enforcement thereof as soon as the judgment has been rendered. . . .” In syllabus point three of State ex rel. Lemley v. Roberts, 164 W. Va. 457, 260 S.E.2d 850 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1981), this Court stated as follows: “'A void judgment, being a nullity, may be attacked, collaterally or directly, at any time and in any court whenever any claim or right is asserted under such judgment.' Syl pt. 3, State ex rel. Vance v. Arthur, 142 W. Va. 737, 98 S.E.2d 418 (1957).”   (See footnote 6)     In West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission v. Wagner, 143 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E.2d 901 (1958), this Court explained that “[t]o enable a court to hear and determine an action, suit or other proceeding it must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the parties; both are necessary and the absence of either is fatal to its jurisdiction.” Id. at 520-21, 102 S.E.2d at 909 (citing Morris v. Calhoun, 119 W. Va. 603, 195 S.E. 341 [1938]). InBowers v. Wurzburg, 205 W. Va. 450, 519 S.E.2d 148 (1999), this Court discussed valid service of process as a prerequisite to the assumption of jurisdiction and explained that “service of process brings the defendant before the court, and personal jurisdiction contemplates whether the defendant is properly before the court so as to permit the tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over his/her person.” Id. at 457 n. 5, 519 S.E.2d at 155 n. 5. The Bowers Court also explained that “'[i]t is well settled that the issuance and service of process in the manner prescribed by law, unless waived, is essential to the jurisdiction of all courts. It is the fact of service which gives the court jurisdiction.'” Id. at 457 n. 5, 519 S.E.2d at 155 n. 5 (quoting 14B Michie's Jurisprudence Process § 5, at 438-39 ).
    Rule 4(d)(1)(B) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at the time of this attempted service, provided that service could be accomplished “by the clerk sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee. . . .” As explained above, service of process in the present case was attempted by certified mail pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)(B). The domestic return receipt for that certified letter was addressed to Michael C. Farber. The temporary secretary, Ms. Kathy Winters, received and signed for the certified mail. Rule 4 also specified that “[s]ervice pursuant to subsection (B) shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a return envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant.”   (See footnote 7)  

    Based upon the evidence regarding the manner in which service of process was attempted, this Court agrees with Mr. Farber that service was defective and therefore void; the lower court did not thereby obtain jurisdiction over Mr. Farber. Proper service of process is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon a circuit court, unless the jurisdictional error is in some manner waived by the party who has not received proper service of process. See Syl. Pt. 2, Teachout v. Larry Sherman's Bakery, Inc., 158 W. Va. 1020, 216 S.E.2d 889 (1975) (“A defendant's objection to the court's jurisdiction over him may be expressed by motion or answer, as provided by Rule 12(b) R.C.P. and, if such jurisdictional objection is so made, the character of any further appearances at the trial, whether special or general, is immaterial and such appearance does not constitute a waiver of such objection”). In the present case, this Court's review of the record does not reveal any appearance by Mr. Farber which could be construed to waive his objection to the lower court's lack of personal jurisdiction over him.   (See footnote 8) 
    Consequently, we find that the default judgment rendered against Mr. Farber is void for lack of jurisdiction. This Court has consistently held that default judgments entered upon defective service of process are void. See Syl. Pt. 4, Jones v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S.E. 367 (1909) (“A default decree rendered upon a defective substituted service of process is void for want of jurisdiction”). The respondents are correct in their assertion that Mr. Farber could have appealed the decision of the lower court; however, the fact that Mr. Farber did not choose to avail himself of the opportunity to appeal does not dispossess him of his right to relief through a writ of prohibition. While Mr. Bailey and the lower court have expressed concern with the delay occasioned by Mr. Farber's failure to immediately pursue an appeal or to obtain relief through a writ of prohibition, we must emphasize that the passage of time does not confer jurisdiction upon the court. The lower court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Farber due to ineffective service of process. Accordingly, we grant the requested writ of prohibition.

Writ Granted.

---

Footnote: 1

    In the complaint, Mr. Bailey alleged that Mr. Farber had been negligent in his representation of Mr. Bailey in an attempt to modify a divorce decree, had failed to appear at hearings, and had not returned telephone calls.

---

Footnote: 2

    Rule 4(d)(1)(B) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at the time of this attempted service, provided for service of a complaint by certified mail with “delivery restricted” to the addressee. The rule further provided that service pursuant to that subdivision “shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant . . . .” Subsequent to the 1998 amendments, the material contained in Rule 4(d)(1)(B) was relocated to rule 4(d)(1)(D) and (E). Thus, the amendments do not affect the outcome of this matter.

---

Footnote: 3

    This amount of damages was based upon evidence submitted in a prior hearing before Judge Risovich.

---

Footnote: 4

    The critical distinction between this Court's approach to jurisdictional issues as opposed to non-jurisdictional issues is apparent in syllabus point four of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), as follows:

        In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

In syllabus point two of Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W. Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973), this Court also emphasized the distinctive analysis of jurisdictional issues:        Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequate, will a writ of prohibition issue.

---

Footnote: 5

    See Black's Law Dictionary 338 (7^th ed. 1999) (defining “coram non judice” as “1. Outside the presence of a judge. 2. Before a judge or court that is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter”).

---

Footnote: 6

    In Stalnaker v. Roberts, 168 W. Va. 593, 287 S.E.2d 166 (1981), this Court overruled Vance, in part. However, the Stalnaker Court clarified that Vance was not overruled “with regard to our holding that a constitutionally infirm, and therefore void judgment, may be collaterally attacked. We overrule Vance . . . only to the extent that [it] permit[s] the forum for that attack to be the Circuit Court of Kanawha County when the original judgment was not rendered in Kanawha County. . . .” 168 W. Va. 593, 599, 287 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1981).

---

Footnote: 7

    Mr. Farber has submitted an affidavit explaining that he has never authorized his secretary or any third party to serve as his agent for accepting his restricted mail. Thus, in this case, it is clear that the secretary was not properly authorized to accept Mr. Farber's restricted mail and that the restricted mail was to be delivered only to the specific addressee. If, however, an individual had properly filed an application for delivery of mail through an agent, acceptance by such agent would successfully effect service of process.

---

Footnote: 8

    As this Court explained in Teachout, the adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure essentially abolished the distinction between general and special appearances by permitting a challenge to the court's jurisdiction by motion under Rule 12(b). See Teachout, 158 W. Va. at 1023-24, 216 S.E.2d at 892.

How Easy It Was to Hack Hillary's Computer

A fascinating article at the UK Register offers advice from Rob Joyce, the head of the National Security Agency’s Tailored Access Operations unit — in other words, the NSA’s chief hacker — on how to protect your network from intruders… such as, oh, let’s say the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations Unit.

Joyce made no bones about describing certain hacking techniques to the Usenix Enigma conference in San Francisco as favorites of his own team.  He laid out a six-stage procedure for penetrating target networks: “reconnaissance, initial exploitation, establish persistence, install tools, move laterally, and then collect, exfiltrate and exploit the data.”

The initial recon stage is something users are becoming more aware of, as headline stories of high-profile cyber-attacks demonstrate how the hackers built a portfolio of targeted systems and key personnel.  In fact, some of the big “hacking” capers involved very little hacking, as most people understand the term — they were carried out by stealing valid user credentials, or tricking network users into exposing their own systems to external threats.

“We need that first crack and we’ll look and look to find it,” said Joyce.  “There’s a reason it’s called an advanced persistent threat; we’ll poke and poke and wait and wait until we get in.”

He said the goal was to “find weak points, whether they be within the network architecture, or in staff who maybe work from home or bring in unauthorized devices.”

How about if the boss is routing sensitive information through an unsecured email serverthat winds up in somebody’s bathroom?

Once weak points are identified, intruders who can’t simply use stolen credentials to loot data from a system will plant various malware tools, create “back door” access for themselves, and otherwise establish the presence they need to carry out the rest of the six-stage attack plan.

Joyce noted that malware tools have become difficult to detect, with today’s threats coming from people who know their stolen data begins losing its value the moment they are discovered.

He also pointed out that many of these malware tools are relatively simple pieces of code, because it’s distressingly easy to trick users into downloading and activating them.  (Joyce demonstrated the point by displaying a barcode his audience could scan to obtain more information about network security… and then razzing anyone who would compromise their computer or cell phone by scanning a code provided by the NSA’s chief hacker.  It’s funny, but it also illustrates an important point about trust in the digital age.)

Simple first-strike malware opens the door for more powerful viruses to be injected into a compromised system later.  Network administrators are making too many obvious mistakes, and failing to follow up on security recommendations — Joyce said his testing team found problems they reported still uncorrected two years later.

Joyce felt those notorious “zero-day exploits” — flaws in software downloads that aren’t detected or patched by providers right away — are overrated, because serious government-sponsored hackers find there are “so many more vectors that are easier, less risky, and more productive.”  He did, however, strongly recommend keeping up on software updates.

He thought the introduction of unsecure elements into secure networks was a common mistake, such as allowing employees to bring portable devices with unknown vulnerabilities into tightly secured environments, or failing to notice that low-security systems like air-conditioning controls are now computerized and capable of interacting with secure networks.

Joyce advised developing a thorough understanding of all devices within, and adjacent to, a secure network.  That’s a task that might prove surprisingly involved for even home users these days.  Try making a mental list of every device you believe is logged into your home or small-business Wi-Fi network… and then check the router’s administration page to see how wrong you are.

In a major security environment, security-conscious administrators should be watching everything, right down to anomalous behavior by individual users.  Joyce expressed reservations about cloud services, because sending data to offline providers effectively adds their security problems to your own.

Combined with the tendency of users to bring portable devices with dubious security profiles into secure networks, the popularity of cloud services could give network administrators a whole new set of vulnerabilities to worry about.  (Here’s another test for you: how many different networks do you think devices in your home or office are interacting with right now?  Your first guess will probably be wrong.)

On the other hand, Joyce stressed that off-site backups are more important than ever for big networks, because nation-state hackers are sometimes interested in destroying data, not just copying it.

The Register says Joyce deserves credit for speaking so frankly with a somewhat unfriendly audience, given the NSA’s reputation these days: “Some of his talk may be self serving and missing crucial details, but almost all of it was useful… Take it with a pinch of salt by all means, but there is useful information here, and Joyce comes across as someone who really does know what he’s talking about.”

Breaking News

Lastest Signups for Election

Mike Vance for Bd of Ed

Jesse Groseclose for CC

Donna Meadows Price for Magistrate

Harvey Galford for Assessor 

Poisoning the Minds of Children Against the Other Parent

    "In this matter, no evidence was offered tending to show that the father abused the child. The ultimate goal in this case is for the child to have the best relationship possible with both of his parents. Therefore, we direct the lower court to forthwith address the issue of visitation so as to establish a meaningful visitation plan for the parties and the child.See footnote 8 8 We remind both the appellant and the appellee not to discourage any visitation with the other parent, or to poison the child in the child's relationship with the other parent in any way. Such conduct would be grounds to modify visitation or even modify custody. See generally, Lesavich v. Anderson, 192 W.Va. 553, 453 S.E.2d 387 (1994) (per curiam);

Anderson v. Newman, 190 W.Va. 577, 439 S.E.2d 442 (1993) (per curiam); and Weece v. Cottle, 177 W.Va. 380, 352 S.E.2d 131 (1986) (per curiam)."

from Sharon B.W. v. George B.W. 1999

4-H Stuff from the Past

Bits and Pieces of the Issue

The Petition

Pocahontas County Board of Education

WEST VIRGINIA CODE

CHAPTER 6. GENERAL PROVISIONS RESPECTING OFFICERS.
ARTICLE 6. REMOVAL OF OFFICERS.

§6-6-1. Definitions.
The term "neglect of duty," or the term "official misconduct," as used in this article, shall include the willful waste of public funds by any officer or officers, or the appointment by him or them of an incompetent or disqualified person to any office or position and the retention of such person in office, or in the position to which he was appointed, after such incompetency or disqualification is made to appear, when it is in the power of such officer to remove such incompetent or disqualified person. 

The term "incompetence," as used in this article, shall include the wasting or misappropriation of public funds by any officer, habitual drunkenness, habitual addiction to the use of narcotic drugs, adultery, neglect of duty, or gross immorality, on the part of any officer. The term "incompetent person," as used in this section, shall include any appointee or employee of any officer or officers, including county court, municipal bodies or officers, and boards of education, who willfully wastes or misappropriates public funds, or who is guilty of habitual drunkenness, habitual addiction to the use of narcotic drugs, adultery, neglect of duty or gross immorality.

And Guess Who His Defense  Lawyer 

is!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Reunions

History of County Schools

School Talk--Kinderman

Currency

From "Survivalblog"

 

There has been talk of doing away with paper currency for several decades, but up until now that has mostly been idle conjecture and mostly bluster. Gradually, however, the building blocks of such a system have indeed been developed. These enabling technologies include:

• Credit cards
• Debit cards
• Postal meters
• Credit and debit card enabled pay phones
• Credit and debit card enabled vending machines
• Credit and debit card enabled “pay before you exit” parking garage kiosks
• Grocery and warehouse store “member” cards
• Automated bank account and wage garnishment by the IRS
• Automated child support and alimony payments
• Transnational debit cards with a Maestro logo (such as EC and Switch cards)
• EBT cards
• Widespread use of cellular smartphones
• Widespread use of tablet and laptop computers
• Direct deposit of payroll checks and Social Security payments
• “E-Stamp” electronic postage stamp equivalents
• Electronic banking
• “Self checkout” terminals at stores
• Point of purchase (POP) credit/debit card terminals
• Credit/debit card enabled gas pumps
• The new chip-equipped “smart” credit cards
• The “Square” and PayPal “Here” credit/debit card readers

Perhaps the most crucial yet underappreciated one of these technologies was the advent of the very compact Square card reader in 2010. The Square magnetic strip card reader is a tiny attachment weighing less than two ounces that plugs into a cell phone. When used with its SquareUp cross-platform app, this device allows anyone with a functioning cell phone signal the ability to process credit card and debit card transactions. The Square reader is now a mature technology that is being mass produced and sold for less than $9.

The other key enabler was the advent of the EBT card, which replaced U.S. food stamps. The EBT card put the Federal government in the debit card-issuing business. Thus, all of the infrastructure is already in place to have a government-issued “Cash Card”. (It would be very quick and easy to start issuing a combination cash and EBT card, which might be marked “Federal Reserve Cash Card” or something similar.)

Here Comes E-Cash

It is noteworthy that some American urban dwellers no longer carry any cash. They pay for all of their everyday expenses with debit cards and credit cards. I expect the number of people in this category to continue to grow.

Back in 2012, the International Business Times, in a story headlined Sweden Going Cashless reported: “In Sweden, monetary transactions made with physical cash are down to three percent of the national economy” and predicted that the country would go entirely cashless in a few years. And just last week, the same publication reported that Norway is now very close to implementing a cashless society by means of cash cards that will entirely replace paper currency and coins. This is a frightening prospect, because once Norway does so other European nations will almost surely soon follow, claiming that “they must” for the sake of competitiveness. And once EU goes cashless, then the U.S. and Canada will likely follow suit.

An Orwellian Nightmare

A cashless society is a Collectivist/Statist Tyrant’s dream come true. It seems like something inspired by George Orwell’s novel 1984. Think of it: Fully documented accounting and taxation on every transaction, large or small, leaving little or no opportunity to conduct free, private enterprise on the gray market or so-called black market. There would be Total Information Awareness of every citizen’s spending habits and Total Information Awareness of every citizen’s travel and business relationships! What better tool for imposing a statist tyranny than having the ability to instantly target individuals, groups of individuals, or even entire demographic groups? Picture this: If you step out of line, then your account gets frozen, levied, or even zeroed in the blink of any eye. (If you think that the FAA’s horribly flawed “No Fly” list is bad, then just imagine a “No Buy” list for everything–even gasoline or groceries!) Have you ever seen the Aaron Eckhart movie titled Erased? Or the Will Smith movie Enemy Of The State? Those movies provide apropos analogies. The bottom line: Any dissent could be crushed, overnight.

Going “cashless” could give bankers, the police, debt collection companies, and/or tax agencies the ability to not only monitor but control and seize the liquid net worth of every private citizen, with no notice whatsoever. The incremental “fees” and taxes could be conducted at many levels simultaneously: local and state sales taxes, a future national sales tax, a future Value Added Tax (VAT), various “sin” taxes on alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, and firearms, et cetera. With a cashless currency, the revenue gathering possibilities are endless.

Going Full Mugabe

Inflation, which is a hidden form of taxation, could be manufactured on demand and then conveniently “eliminated” by dropping a zero from a national currency unit. This process could be repeated, as needed, allowing governments to overspend to their heart’s desire. (Without the bother of printing and minting currency, any government could inflate their currency as much as they’d like. No muss, no fuss.)

All Crime Is Retail

The implementation of e-currency will no doubt be heralded in the mainstream press with cries of “All crime is retail”, meaning that without cash then most property crimes would be made very difficult or even impossible. What is the point of stealing someone’s wallet, if all that it contains is a driver’s license and a Cash Card that is worthless without a personal Identification Number (PIN)? Why steal anyone’s household property if it cannot be resold on the black market? The whole concept of a “bank robbery” at gunpoint would become ludicrous. They will also claim that it will eliminate street begging. And the narco-traffickers would lose the ability to transport their proceeds. The Generally Dumb Public (GDP) will be easily swayed by such arguments. So, I predict that the majority of the citizenry will be in favor of the “convenient” switch to digital currency.

Rural Exceptions?

Fully implementing an electronic currency in a nation as vast as the United States could prove difficult. Here in my corner of The American Redoubt, for example, there is no cellular phone coverage, and there probably won’t be for another 20 years. (The population density is so low that it does not justify the expense of building cell phone towers.) How could we “Square” our transactions without cell phones? So it is conceivable that an exception will be made for some rural residents. Perhaps this exception might be by allowing the continued use of U.S. coinage in rural areas. We’ll see what happens.

The Ultimate Stumbling Block: The Banksters

Here in the United States, the banksters effectively control our government. (If you doubt that they do, then just think of the last time that a banker truly LOST any money in a financial crisis. They no longer lose, because they are now always the first in line for full government bailouts. The game is rigged.) The key stumbling block to implementing a new e-currency will be the bankers themselves. Why? Because they make huge sums of money on credit card interest payments and banking fees, and they are loathe to giving up those revenue streams. So if a “Cash Card” system were ever put in place in the U.S. of A., I am almost certain that the bankers would insist that they still somehow get their generous slice of pie. Perhaps the national Cash Card “deposits” could somehow be proportionally divided between the regional Federal Reserve banks and local banks for “safekeeping”, based upon the ZIP codes of the resident “depositers”. Then, along with gradually higher interest rates, the banks would profit handsomely on the float of all those billions of “e-dollars”. (The switch to E-cash would drive all of the mattress money out of circulation; thus, the banksters would finally control all of the money supply.)

Speedy Implementation

When the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve eventually do away with circulating Federal Reserve Notes and coins, it will probably be a swift transition. It is conceivable that as little as 60 days will be allowed for people to turn in their mattress money and empty their piggy banks before the paper currency is declared null and void. (Foreigner holders of U.S. Dollars will probably be allowed six months, or even longer.) Soon after, U.S. Savings bonds will also be called in, probably with a longer window of opportunity–perhaps two years. And then, finally, it will become illegal to hold foreign paper currencies or bearer bonds. That will be the proverbial last nail in the coffin for currency privacy.

If you think that the preceding sounds like some sort of implausible fiction, then consider this: In the depths of The Great Depression of the 1930s, the U.S. government forcibly called in all of the circulating gold coins in the country. The populace went along with it, with hardly a peep of discontent. I can foresee that in the next great financial crisis we will witness some highly-publicized bank runs, bank closures, and “bank holidays”. Following that, there will be loud calls for a digital currency, ostensibly so that “people will always have access to their deposits”. Count on it.

Plan Ahead!

Since the adoption of a digital currency now appears inevitable, I recommend that SurvivalBlog readers proactively begin to take a few defensive measures to buffer themselves:

1. Invest in some pre-1965 U.S. dimes and quarters. These coins were minted with 90% silver and therefore will continue to be valuable for barter, regardless of what the politicians and banksters dream up.
2. Invest in common caliber ammunition. Again, like small silver coins, ammo is ideal for barter, because it is: A.) Easily Recognizable B.) Durable, C.) Desirable. D.) Useful, and E.) Easily Divisible.
3. Invest in some rolls of U.S. nickels (five cent pieces). These are the only coins still in common circulation that have a base metal value (an alloy of copper and nickel) that is equal to their face value. (Yes, I know, pre-1981 pennies have real value, but they must be sorted.) If our current coinage ever formally goes out of circulation, I predict that nickels will still be used as a de factobarter currency.
4. If you keep any non-U.S. currency on hand for traveling, then convert it into Swiss Franc currency. I predict that even if the rest of Europe goes cashless, then the Swiss government will keep the Swiss Franc in circulation, right alongside the transnational e-cash cards.
5. If you have substantial wealth, then open an offshore banking account. For most Americans, the best hedge would be a demand account (with an accompanying debit card) that is denominated in Swiss Francs with a bank in the Cayman Islands or on St. Kitts. While you are at it, also get a safe deposit box offshore, and store some of your precious metals there.
6. Practice bartering, and gather the requisite reference books.
7. Install Bitcoin on your computer, and practice using it. (Note: because of the many wild fluctuations in the value of Bitcoin, I DO NOT recommend keeping more than a few hundred Dollars worth of your “cash” in the form of Bitcoin.)
8. Pray hard. Pray first for repentance, and then pray that God providentially puts you in the right place, at the right time, with the right people, to be able to live without Taking The Mark. (There are many American Christians who believe that a universal electronic cash card might then be soon replaced by a universal biochip. See: Revelation 13:16-17. For some insights on whether or not we are now living in “The End Times”, see the preaching of Pastor J.D. Farag, of Calvary Chapel Kaneohe, Hawaii , on YouTube. Pay special attention to the 11 minute mark, and beyond.)

In closing, remember that there are three types of people in the world: Those who make things happen, those who watch things happen, and those who wonder “What just happened?” Don’t be in that last category! – JWR

(Note: Permission is granted for re-posting of this entire article but only if done so in full, with proper attribution to James Wesley, Rawles and SurvivalBlog, and only if the included links are preserved.)